“Existence Itself” defined as the “Totality of Everything Existing” in its inner or all inclusive thought-like aspect, is the most universal of all mental universals. In its outer or all exclusive matter-like aspect it is the most particular of all sensory particulars as there is no existence other than “Existence Itself”.

Taken from either and/or both the all-inclusive or all-exclusive perspectives, “Existence” as the solution set to {x: x=the totality of everything existing} invariably contains “Existence” itself both as its own “improper subset” and as the “empty set.” It is every-thing in general and no-thing in particular.

In other words, it is as if “Existence Itself” (aka Ultimate Reality) while existing without quality as its own Self-reflection, simultaneously exists as both the universal and as the particular Porphyrian limits (or boundary conditions) of our phenomenal world of experience. Seeming Reality is thus inherently holographic and fractal in nature, as Ultimate Reality exists in its totality at, and as, every infinitesimal here and now point comprising our mind stream’s continuum of phenomenal experience.

“Existence” itself, is the improper subset of “Existence” and this remains true whether “Existence” is considered from either its thought-like aspect or its matter like aspect.

As improper subsets of each other, the thought-like aspect and the matter-like aspect of “Existence Itself” are experienced as if they were two hands embracing the Seeming Reality of our phenomenal existence. Nevertheless as the sole Ultimate Reality, Existence Itself remains its own perfect self-reflection. Its inner is its outer and its outer is its inner.

Because of this fact, although it is indeed the "Most Universal of All Mental Universals", Existence Itself cannot be conceived without contradiction as exclusively a Universal Mind.

Nor (again because of this same fact) can it be conceived without contradiction as exclusively a prime matter even though it is in fact the "Most Particular of All Sensory Particulars.”

In essence, the open eye of your heart is smarter than smart and more mobile than motion.

Containing both the improper subset of itself and the null set as subsets, “Existence Itself” is the very existence and the very non-existence of the totality of your outer physical and your inner mental worlds of experience.

Your existence and your non-existence are none other than the existence of “Existence” itself. Your existence is neither your existence, nor other than your existence because you can’t be said to exist or not to exist along with, apart from, side by side or in Existence itself, neither can you be said to be other than existing or other than not existing separate or independent from Existence itself.

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Excerpt Two

I. The paradox of self-refuting self-referential totalities

In discussing “Existence Itself” it is often useful to distinguish between self-referential and non-self-referential concepts, that is, between “homological” and “heterological” concepts respectively.

Interestingly enough, a self-referential paradox arises when we consider the word "heterological."

In this case, if we suppose that the word “heterological” applies to itself (thus being homological), then it is not heterological and does not apply to itself. But if we suppose that it does not apply to itself (thus being heterological), then it does apply to itself and is homological.

Bertrand Russell developed his Theory of Types as a proposed solution for the group of self-referential paradoxes that arise when we consider the notion of “The class of all classes that are not members of themselves.” Is this class a member of itself? If it is it isn’t. If it isn’t it is.

This self-referential paradox is now known as Russell’s paradox and occurs whenever we allow the definition (of a particular phenomenal set) to refer to itself.

Because “Existence” Exists, as the “Totality of Everything Existing” it includes the knower as well as the known, it applies to and includes itself and is thus itself self-referential. It is a set (or class) which is a member of itself. In a significantly different (but still self-referential) fashion, the term “homological” is itself homological.

Ironically, a self-referential paradox also arises if considering "Existence" itself, we attempt to abide by Russell’s proposed solution for avoiding self-referential paradoxes.

For Russell’s strategy does not allow, “Existence” to be taken as a member of the class of everything existing. Existence cannot itself, be said to exist.

If we, in this manner, take the concept "existence" as non-self-referential, we find ourselves saddled, with the self-refuting, self-referential notion of “The totality of everything existing that is not a member of itself,” for our definition of existence.

What then are we to make of this definition of existence? The expression “The totality of everything existing that is not a member of itself” is itself paradoxical. Is it a member of itself or not? If it is, it isn’t. If it isn’t, it is.

The awkwardness of this unwanted consequence of implementing Russell’s proposed way of avoiding self-referential paradoxes might have caused it to have been challenged more vigorously and sooner, had it not meshed so nicely with Kant’s flawed treatment of the “Totality of Everything Existing.” For Kant this totality cannot itself be said to exist in a positive sense as an actual existing entity, but only in a negative sense as a limit (i.e. as a relation of actual existing entities).

But note: This ontological distinction between entities and their interdependent relations is flawed on two counts.

First off, Kant’s so-called “actual entities” are actually interdependent phenomena whose very existence is non-other than the existence of “Existence Itself”, yet he treats them as if they were independently existing entities in their own right. Ontologically, the circular reasoning inherent in this positing of actual entities (what Bertrand Russell, in developing his theory of types, was later to refer to as “genuine individuals”) is best illustrated in terms of its method. For Kant, as in modern physics, matter and energy are defined in terms of
space and time, while space and time are defined in terms of matter and energy which are defined in terms of space and time, etc. ad infinitum.

And second, this distinction between these so-called entities and their interdependent relations rests on an a priori distinction, hidden at the foundation of Kant’s analysis asserting the ontological primacy of sense intuition over mental intuition. In fact, even while denying a direct intellectual intuition of the noumenal world (which Kant conflated with Ultimate Reality) is even possible, Kant explicitly affirms a direct (yet veiled) sensory intuition of the noumenal world.

The ontological status of the sensory particulars forming the 3rd person perspective of our physical worlds of experience is thus held (by Kant) to be superior to the ontological status of the mental universals forming the 1st person perspective of our mental worlds of experience.

And this is no minor or trivial aspect of Kant’s analysis, but a fundamental and crucial facet of its underlying semantic thrust. Buddhism takes as “given” both the thought-like and matter-like attributes of “Existence,” while Kant a priori strips all thought-like attributes from it, telling us “Existence” is beyond the reach of reason’s categories. Kant reduces existence to a “mere concept” (a mere component of the phenomenal world), out of place in the noumenal world.

All forms of Buddhism, (Hinayana, Mahayana, or Vajrayana), take the mind as a sixth sense, an organ for the perception of mental universals, even as the five physical senses are organs for the perception of sensory particulars. Thus for the dominant tenet systems of Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism, sense particulars and mental universals are ontologically on par, neither is more fundamental than, or an epiphenomena of, the other.

For Kant, the five physical senses and the mind are treated differently. The five physical senses are organs for the perception of sense particulars whereas the universals (categories) are no longer perceived by the mind. Rather they are taken to be innate within the mind. Sense particulars are thus, for Kant, ontologically more fundamental than mental universals, as regards the phenomenal world of experience.

Paradoxically Kant’s proposition that statements about “Existence” lie outside of the legitimate sphere of reason’s function, is itself a statement about “Existence.” As such, it is self-refuting…..

The notion that physics and metaphysics belong to separate realms and must be kept separate if the legitimate function of reason is not to be perverted is itself a metaphysical statement about physics. As such it is also self-refuting……

And so it also turns out, this hidden metaphysical assumption, (that the observer can be excluded from what is observed), underpinning the approach to modern physics beginning with Descartes continuing through Newton and Einstein and culminating in the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is itself (when applied to the totality of everything existing), a self-refuting self-referential paradox.

This startling observation is strangely reminiscent of how the logical positivist manifesto; “All propositions are either tautological, empirical or nonsense,” collapsed under its own weight, when it was pointed out that this proposition was itself neither tautological nor empirical. Thus the logical positivist manifesto was also revealed to be itself a self-referential paradox.

These few examples serve to illustrate that any attempt to strip Existence Itself of existence or of its self-referential and atemporal nature is inherently self-defeating, leading to logical contradictions.

Q.E.D. Existence Itself exists as an atemporally self-referential unity whose veil is tis oneness